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DOCTORS & JURIES
Philip G. Peters,Jr.*

Physicians widely believe thatjury verdicts are unfair This Article
tests that assumption by synthesizing three decades of jury research. Contrary to popular belief the data show that juries
consistently sympathize more with doctors who are sued than with
patients who sue them. Physicianswin roughly half of the cases that
expert reviewers believe physiciansshould lose and nearly all of the
cases that experts feel physicians should win. Defendants and their
hired experts, it turns out, are more successful than plaintiffs and
their hired experts at persuadingjuries to reach verdicts contrary to
the opinions of independent reviewers.
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INTRODUCTION

Legislation is pending in both houses of Congress to transfer medical
malpractice cases from civil juries to administrative health courts.' The
Institute of Medicine also wants to take malpractice cases away from juries
and endorses experiments with both health courts and a system of binding
early settlement offers! Each of these proposals is premised in part on the
intuitive assumption that juries lack the capacity to resolve medical malpractice disputes fairly. This Article evaluates that premise. It collects and
synthesizes three decades of empirical research on jury decision-making,
updating the seminal review done by Neil Vidmar over a decade ago.
Four important findings emerge from the data. First, negligence matters.
Weak cases rarely win, close cases do better, and cases with strong evidence
of medical negligence fare best. Second, the agreement rate between juries
and experts is very high in the class of cases that most worries critics of
malpractice litigation, that is, cases with weak evidence of negligence. Juries agree with expert reviewers in eighty to ninety percent of these cases.
That is a better agreement rate than physicians typically have with each
other. Third, the agreement rate is much lower in cases with strong evidence
of negligence. Doctors consistently win about fifty percent of the cases that
experts believe the plaintiffs should win. Fourth, the consistently low success rate of malpractice plaintiffs in cases that expert reviewers feel they
should win strongly suggests the presence of one or more factors that systematically favor medical defendants in the courtroom, such as better
litigation teams or pronounced jury reluctance to find doctors liable. From
the perspective of defendants at least, jury performance is remarkably good.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I reviews the widespread criticism
of jury performance and the range of views on this issue held by academic
experts. Part II examines the data showing that defendants win most medical

1. Fair and Reliable Medical Justice Act, S. 1337, 109th Cong. (2005) (authorizing pilot
demonstrations of alternatives to litigation, including health courts); Medical Liability Procedural
Reform Act, H.R. 1546, 109th Cong. (2005) (authorizing grants to up to seven states to establish
health courts).
2.

INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, FOSTERING RAPID ADVANCES

IN HEALTH CARE: LEARNING

FROM SYSTEM DEMONSTRATIONS 10 (Janet M. Corrigan et al. eds., 2002), available at http://
www.nap.edu/books/0309087074/html/ (recommending demonstration projects testing both reform
proposals).
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malpractice jury trials. It compares those findings with the data indicating
that most trials involve cases with weak evidence of negligence.
Part III synthesizes the studies which have compared jury verdicts with
the opinions of expert reviewers. These studies have consistently found a
direct correlation between the strength of the plaintiff's case as evaluated by
an expert and the likelihood of a plaintiff's verdict. However, the studies
also show that jury performance is not perfect, especially in cases with
strong evidence of negligence.
Part IV reviews the reasons why juries and reviewers sometimes reach
different conclusions about the same case and then identifies the factors
most likely to explain the unique pattern of disagreement found in medical
malpractice cases. Those factors are (1) the normal variation that occurs
when multiple individuals are asked to evaluate the same conduct (interrater variability), (2) the superior litigation resources sometimes available to
one of the parties, usually the defendant, (3) jury antipathy toward people
who sue their physicians, and (4) jury reluctance to find a doctor liable
when the proper outcome is unclear. At present, we lack the data needed to
estimate the relative influence of each of these factors.
The studies reveal that juries treat physicians very favorably, perhaps unfairly so. The data also justify the surprising conclusion that juries are more
likely to defer to the judgment of a physician defendant than other physicians are. As a consequence, politicians and critics of jury performance in
medical malpractice cases should think twice before concluding that doctors
will be treated more favorably in health courts.
I. JURIES
Hapless juries have become the symbol of a civil justice system run
amok.3 Critics claim that juries render irrational and unjust verdicts.4 The
jury trial, claims critic Peter Huber, is really "a generous sort of charity."'
3.

STEPHEN DANIELS & JOANNE MARTIN, CIVIL JURIES AND THE POLITICS OF REFORM 1-2

(1995).
4.
Id.; NEIL VIDMAR, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE AMERICAN JURY: CONFRONTING
THE MYTHS ABOUT JURY INCOMPETENCE, DEEP POCKETS, AND OUTRAGEOUS DAMAGE AWARDS
122-23 (1995) (reciting complaints about jury incompetence to determine cases of professional
liability). Both the AMA and the Physician Payment Review Commission have concluded that lay
juries reach different decisions than physicians would. Id. at 162; PHYSICIAN PAYMENT REVIEW
COMM'N, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, 1992, at 186 (1992); Kirk B. Johnson et al., A FaultBased Administrative Alternative for Resolving Medical Malpractice Claims, 42 VAND. L. REV.

1365, 1367-73 (1989); see AMA/Specialty Soc'y Med. Liab. Project, A Proposed Alternative to the
Civil Justice System for Resolving Medical Liability Disputes: A Fault-Based Administrative System,
52 MEDICINE 347, 347-48 (1988).
5.

PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION

AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

(1988). President George W. Bush stated the charge this way:
Doctors and hospitals realize ....it's expensive to fight a lawsuit, even if it doesn't have any
merit. And because the system is so unpredictable, there is a constant risk of being hit by a massive jury award. So doctors end up paying tens of thousands, or even hundreds of thousands of
dollars to settle claims out of court, even when they know they have done nothing wrong.

12
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According to this account, malpractice insurers are frightened into paying
substantial sums to settle frivolous lawsuits because they dread the "lottery"
of a jury trial. Those settlements then spawn a new wave of frivolous
claims. 6 Through this domino effect, jury incompetence poisons the entire
civil justice system.
Even respected legal scholars are skeptical of the jury's capacity to decide malpractice cases fairly. Clark Havighurst, for example, has said that
"realism compels recognition that juries are often poorly positioned to
choose reliably between the well argued, but often highly confusing, theories of the two sides' experts" and "often fall back on such irrelevancies as
the witnesses' demeanor and style of presentation or sympathy for the plaintiff's plight or the defendants' reputation. ' Stephen Sugarman also doubts
the ability of jurors to choose between competing experts "whose scientific
credibility the jurors are unlikely to accurately appraise."'
Is that picture accurate? The most recent extended review of the literature appears in Neil Vidmar's classic 1995 book Medical Malpractice and
the American Jury.9 In this book, Vidmar summarizes some of the empirical
studies, including his own, that compared jury verdicts to the ratings given
to the plaintiff's medical care by independent physicians.'0 From this body
of data, he concludes "that there is reasonable concordance between jury
verdicts and doctors' ratings of negligence. On balance, juries may have a
slight bias in favor of doctors.""
For some scholars, however, empirical evidence of a statistically significant relationship between jury verdicts and expert opinion is too thin a basis
for concluding that juries do their job well. Mark Hall rightly notes that
"[f]inding a statistical association between jury results and expert opinions
means only that jury verdicts as a whole are not entirely random or unpredictable."" Thomas Metzloff used similar caution in 1993 to describe the
empirical evidence then available, noting only that jury verdicts were not
TOM BAKER, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH

13 (2005) (quoting a January 2005 speech in

Collinsville, Illinois).
6. DANIELS & MARTIN, supra note 3, at 4-5; VIDMAR, supra note 4, at 3 (citing claims that
jury errors encourage frivolous claims); Thomas B. Metzloff, Resolving Malpractice Disputes:
Imaging the Jury's Shadow, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1991, at 43, 46 (1991) (noting the
signaling function of jury verdicts).
7.

CLARK

C.

HAVIGHURST ET AL., HEALTH CARE LAW AND POLICY

1018 (2d ed. 1998).

8.
Stephen D. Sugarman, The Need to Reform Personal Injury Law Leaving Scientific Disputes to Scientists, 248 SCi. 823, 823 (1990).
9.

VIDMAR, supra note 4.

10. Id.; see also Neil Vidmar, The Performance of the American Civil Jury: An Empirical
Perspective, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 849, 858-59 (1998) [hereinafter Vidmar, American Civil Jury]; Neil
Vidmar, Are Juries Competent to Decide Liability in Tort Cases Involving Scientific/MedicalIssues?
Some Datafrom Medical Malpractice,43 EMORY L.J. 885, 903-06 (1994) [hereinafter Vidmar, Are
Juries Competent] (also reviewing much of the literature).
II.

VIDMAR, supra note 4, at 182.

12. MARK A. HALL,
ETHICS 269 (6th ed. 2003).

MARY ANNE BoBINSKI

&

DAVID ORENTLICHER, HEALTH CARE LAW &
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"random."' 3 Based on his own empirical research, he concluded that "[m]ost
of the time, jury outcomes represent a fair resolution of the claim, but the
risk that the result will not be fair is real and troubling.' 4
If that is the best that can be said in defense of jury performance, then
critics of jury decision-making have a powerful basis for complaint. However, the body of empirical data currently available offers insights into jury
behavior that are both more complex than the public rhetoric and, at least
for physicians, more reassuring.
II.

PLAINTIFF WIN RATES

Although juries are widely believed to be biased against physicians, patients lose twice as many medical malpractice verdicts as they win. Does
this refute the charge that juries favor injured claimants? Not necessarily.
Standing alone, win rates tell us very little about the fairness of jury verdicts. According to a convincing body of empirical research on medical
malpractice trials, weak claims dominate the mix of cases that go to trial.
The poor quality of the pool of cases that go to trial means that it is inappropriate to expect a fifty-fifty split in verdicts.
Yet the intuitive appeal of this benchmark is so powerful that the Supreme Court and prominent legal scholars have employed it to evaluate the
fairness of adjudicative processes. That is a mistake. Although the poor success that malpractice plaintiffs have in front of juries does place a ceiling on
the magnitude of any proplaintiff bias that might exist, the low plaintiff win
rate does not tell us whether the right claims win or even whether the right
fraction does. 5
A. The Fifty PercentHypothesis

The belief that a fair adjudicatory process will produce a roughly even
split in verdicts is widely held, even by sophisticated observers. Harry
Kalven, for example, believed that the fifty-five percent plaintiff win rate
that he found in his large study of personal injury cases showed that juries
are not "monolithically pro-plaintiff."16 Similarly, the Supreme Court inferred that a disability benefits process was procedurally fair from the fact

13.

Metzloff, supra note 6, at 115.

14. Id. Metzloff called for "meaningful procedural reforms within the context of the current
system." Id.
15.

See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case Outcomes Really Reveal Any-

thing About the Legal System? Win Rates and Removal Jurisdiction, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 581, 583-

92 (1998) (explaining how win rates can be influenced by selection effects).
16. Harry Kalven, Jr., The Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 VA. L. REV. 1055, 1072 (1964); cf.
Shari Seidman Diamond & Mary R. Rose, Real Juries, I ANN. REV. LAw & Soc. Sci. 255, 262
(2005) (noting favorably that plaintiffs win about half of the time, but also acknowledging that "it is
not clear what the win rate ought to be").
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that nearly fifty percent of the benefits denials were reversed." Win rates are

an appealing measure of substantive fairness. The more balanced the outcomes, the more evenhanded the process seems.
The intuition that a fair process will produce an even split in verdicts
also has powerful theoretical support. According to the "fifty percent hypothesis" of negotiation theory,'" the cases most likely to settle are those in
which liability is either clearly present or clearly absent.' 9 Because these
"easy" cases are likely to settle, the cases that go to trial will tend to be
2

"close" cases. 0 In the trials of those toss-up cases, plaintiffs and defendants
should win a roughly equal number of verdicts.
The fifty percent hypothesis also has empirical support. In their landmark study of the settlement process, George Priest and Benjamin Klein
gathered data on all civil jury trials in Cook County, Illinois from 1959
through 1979. The overall plaintiff win rate stayed in the vicinity of the fifty
percent mark for virtually the entire period." Although other scholars have
questioned the applicability of this model to individual fields of litigation,22
the fifty percent hypothesis retains considerable vigor. Consistent with the
hypothesis, for example, a 2001 survey by the Bureau of Justice Statistics
found a win rate in all tort trials of fifty-two percent. 23
Surprisingly, the fifty-fifty split anticipated by negotiation theory should
be present even in courts that are systematically biased against one side. As
long as the bias is foreseeable, the parties can be expected to take this bias
into account when they make their settlement decisions.24 The "close" cases

17. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 410 (1971). But see Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319, 346 (1976) (stating that "[blare statistics rarely provide a satisfactory measure of the fairness of
a decisionmaking process," yet accepting general inference).
See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J.
1, 17-25 (1984) (predicting that win rates will converge to fifty percent as the parties'
abilities to predict trial outcomes improve).
18.

LEGAL STUD.

19.

See Metzloff, supra note 6, at 63.

20. Priest & Klein, supra note 18, at 14-15 (predicting that the vast majority of the cases
which go to trial will be the borderline cases); FRANK A. SLOAN ET AL., SUING FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 168 (1993) (treating this as an accepted premise). Over time, the parties will become
adept at predicting trial outcomes and the win rate will converge to fifty percent. See Priest & Klein,
supra note 18, at 17-25.
21. Priest & Klein, supra note 18, at 32 tbl.4 (showing a win rate between forty-five and
fifty-five percent in all but two years, 1972 and 1977).
22. E.g., Theodore Eisenberg, Testing the Selection Effect: A New Theoretical Framework
with Empirical Tests, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 337, 339-40, 352 (1990) (stating that the fifty percent
hypothesis is a plausible description of tort litigation, but not of all civil litigation and also producing data suggesting that the fifty percent hypothesis may only apply to overall tort rates that are an
amalgam of deviant win rates in the respective subfields). Priest and Klein themselves had found
that some fields of litigation departed from the fifty percent prediction (including medical malpractice litigation). Priest & Klein, supra note 18, at 38-39.
23.

THOMAS

H.

COHEN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE TRIALS

AND VERDICTS IN LARGE COUNTIES,

2001, at 1 (2004), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjsl

pub/pdf/mmtvlcO I.pdf.
24.

See Priest & Klein, supra note 18, at 5, 7 & n.24.
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in those jurisdictions will be the cases that the parties believe could go either
way in front of a biased fact-finder. 2' As long as the court's bias is foresee-6
able, the plaintiff win rate at trial should still hover around fifty percent.1
Although the tribunal's bias will produce unjust outcomes, that unfairness
will not be evident from the bare win rate. Instead, the unfairness will be
reflected in the terms of the pretrial settlements and in the fate of cases that
ought to prevail at trial.
Conceivably, the low win rate in malpractice cases could be attributed to
the predominance of weak cases in the overall pool of lawsuits. According
to negotiation theory, however, the fifty percent hypothesis should survive
this imbalance in the initial pool of claims. The weak claims should still
settle more frequently than the toss-up cases because the parties have a relatively easy time28estimating the expected value of these cases and agreeing
on a settlement. As a result, the "selection effect" of the settlement process
should wash out asymmetries in the underlying pool of disputes and yield a
trial win rate close to fifty percent.
B. The Win Rate in Malpractice Cases
The win rate in medical malpractice trials consistently departs from the
fifty percent hypothesis and has done so for decades. In an exhaustive review of decades of research and dozens of empirical analyses, Valerie Hans
and Neal Vidmar concluded that medical malpractice plaintiffs win roughly
30% of their jury trials. 30 The most recent comprehensive review of the data
comes from the Bureau of Justice Statistics, which systematically sampled
malpractice jury verdicts in 1992, 1996, and 2001 from the seventy-five

25. Initially, prediction errors might result in win rates that departure materially from a fiftyfifty split, but the size of this departure should diminish as the parties become better at predicting
the jury's decisions. Id. at 18-19.
26. Id. at 5 ("[P]laintiff victories will tend toward 50 percent whether the legal standard is
negligence or strict liability, whether judges orjuries are hostile or sympathetic.").
27. The settlement data strongly suggest that defendants have superior bargaining power, but
provide no clues about the contribution of anticipated prodefendant jury bias to that bargaining
power. See Philip G. Peters, Jr., What We Know About Malpractice Settlements, 92 IOWA L. REV.
(forthcoming July 2007) (manuscript at 40-53), availableat http://ssm.com/abstract=891120.
28. See Priest & Klein, supra note 18, at 17-20. By settling, each party saves the costs of
preparing for and participating in a trial.
29. See Eisenberg, supra note 22, at 340. While an extraordinary number of weak claims in
the initial pool could theoretically produce a trial mix dominated by weak cases simply by virtue of
their raw numbers, even though they settle at a higher rate than closer cases, this probably does not
explain the low win rate in malpractice cases. Indeed, meritless claims actually settle less regularly
than strong claims and, as a result, are overrepresented in the trial mix. The 2006 findings of David
Studdert and his colleagues are typical. Claims lacking merit constituted thirty-seven percent of
their total sample of claims, but fifty-six percent of the cases that went to a jury verdict. See David
M. Studdert et al., Claims, Errors,and Compensation Payments in Medical MalpracticeLitigation,
354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2024, 2030 tbl.2 (2006).
30.

VALERIE HANS

&

NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY

(1986).
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most heavily populated counties in the United States.3 Over that period of
time, the plaintiff win rate dropped from 30% to 27%.32 In the 2001 sample
of 1,038 trials, "[t]he overall win rate for medical malpractice plaintiffs
(27%) was about half of that found among plaintiffs in all tort trials
(52%)."33 A number of studies have found that malpractice 34cases have the
lowest plaintiff success rate of any category of tort litigation.
The poor success rate of malpractice plaintiffs is made even more evident when cases with contested damages, but admitted liability, are excluded

from the calculation.35 In his study of North Carolina malpractice verdicts,
Thomas Metzloff found that plaintiffs received a significant award of damages in only 11% of the cases in which liability was genuinely at issue.16 In
her earlier landmark study, Patricia Danzon also found that the win rate
shrank materially when uncontested cases were excluded.37
C. Selection Effect

Opponents of tort reform often argue that the very limited success of
malpractice plaintiffs at trial proves that juries are neither biased against
wealthy physicians nor readily manipulated into rendering verdicts based on
their sympathy for badly injured patients. Some have even suggested that
the difficulty of obtaining a plaintiff's verdict demonstrates that juries are
31.
TICE

COHEN,

supra note 23;

CAROL

J.

DEFRANCES & MARIKA

FX.

LITRAS, BUREAU OF JUS-

STATISTICS, CIVIL TRIAL CASES AND VERDICTS IN LARGE COUNTIES,

1996 (1999);

CAROL J.

DEFRANCES ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CIVIL JURY CASES AND VERDICTS IN LARGE
COUNTIES (1995).

32. See COHEN, supra note 23, at tbls. I & 3. Materials from the Jury Verdict Research website show win rates between 29% and 38% for each year between 1995 and 2000.
http://www.juryverdict research.com/Press releases/medmal_01.html (May, 10 2002). However, jury
verdict reporting services tend to oversample significant plaintiffs' victories and, thus, to overstate
both plaintiff success rates and average verdict size. Frank Sloan and Chee Ruey Hsieh, for example, found an actual win rate of 22% in the trials of the claims they studied in Florida, where a jury
verdict reporting service had reported that plaintiffs won 66% percent of their verdicts. Frank A.
Sloan & Chee Ruey Hsieh, Variability in Medical Malpractice Payments: Is the Compensation
Fair?,24 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 997, 1007 (1990).
33. COHEN, supra note 23, at 1. Those rates are consistent with the findings of the most
recent small-scale study, published in 2006, which found a win rate of twenty-one percent for medical malpractice plaintiffs. Studdert et al., supra note 29, at 2026.
34.

E.g., DEFRANCES & LITRAS, supra note 31, at 6 tbl.5; Stephen Daniels & Lori Andrews,

The Shadow of the Law: Jury Decisions in Obstetricsand Gynecology Cases, in 2 MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY AND THE DELIVERY OF OBSTETRICAL CARE 161, 173-75 & tbl.3 (Victoria P.

Rostow & Roger J. Bulger eds., 1989) (finding that the plaintiff success rate for malpractice was
below the overall rate in all but two of forty-six counties surveyed and that those two counties had
few malpractice verdicts); Priest & Klein, supra note 18, at 38 tbl.7 (finding malpractice cases had
the lowest success rate among the categories of tort litigation analyzed).
35. See Diamond & Rose, supra note 16, at 262 (noting that the usual figures on plaintiff
win rates are "inflated because liability is either uncontested or only partially contested in some
percentage of the cases counted as plaintiff wins").
36.

Metzloff, supra note 6, at 52.

37.

See PATRICIA M. DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND PUBLIC

POLICY 24, 38-39 (1985).
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prejudiced against people who sue their doctors, a bias suggested by research showing that potential jurors are skeptical of medical malpractice
plaintiffs.3" However, the data suggest an equally plausible alternative: weak

claims dominate the trial docket.
Taragin's study of 976 malpractice verdicts is by far the largest. He and
his colleagues found that only 10% of the trials involved negligent care and
eleven percent were too close to call. Thus, 78% of the trials involved weak

claims.3 9 The weak claims outnumbered the strong ones 8 to 1.

The other studies are considerably smaller, but they, too, have found that

weak claims outnumber strong ones at trial. In Thomas Metzloff's study of
48 trials, the defense insurer believed that only 23% of the tried cases had
sufficient evidence of negligence to support a jury verdict, while 42% did

not, and the remaining 35% were unclear40 As a consequence, Metzloff concluded that the trial pool consists "of a solid core of marginal claims in
which the insurers routinely prevail.' ' Danzon reached the same conclusion
in her study of malpractice litigation, stating that the cases that go to trial
are "a small, atypical subset" in which the evidence for the plaintiff is
weak.42
Other studies are in agreement. In their analysis of 26 malpractice trials,
Henry Farber and Michelle White found that 57% involved good care while
only 19% involved poor care.43 In a separate study of 13 trials, they found

that 69% of the trials involved good care and only 8% involved poor care."
Ralph Peeples, Catherine Harris, and Metzloff found a similar imbalance in
their examination of 19 trials-there were over 5 times as many weak
claims as strong.4 5
However, other studies have failed to find a substantial imbalance in

the trial mix. A study of 37 Florida jury verdicts by Frank Sloan and his
38. See, e.g., VIDMAR, supra note 4, at 182 ("The evidence in fact indicates that ....[o]n
balance, juries may have a slight bias in favor doctors."); Metzloff, supra note 6, at 83 (noting that a
possible explanation for defendants beating the odds more often than plaintiffs is the operation of a
jury bias in favor of doctors).
39. Mark I. Taragin et al., The Influence of Standard of Care and Severity of Injury on the
Resolution of Medical MalpracticeClaims, 117 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 780, 783 tbl.3 (1992).
40.

See Metzloff, supra note 6, at 69 tbl.6.

41.

Id. at 76-77.

42. DANZON, supra note 37, at 51 ("[Malpractice] cases that are actually litigated to verdict
constitute a small, atypical subset, 'self-selected' to that stage of disposition precisely because the
outcome was unpredictable to the litigants, the potential award was large, and the evidence for the
plaintiff was weak.").
43. Henry S. Farber & Michelle J. White, A Comparison of Formal and Informal Dispute
Resolution in Medical Malpractice,23 J. LEGAL STUD. 777, 802 (1994).
44. See Henry S. Farber & Michelle J. White, Medical Malpractice:An Empirical Examination of the Litigation Process,22 RAND J. ECON. 199, 204 (1991).
45. Ralph Peeples et al., The Process of Managing Medical Malpractice Cases: The Role of
Standard of Care, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 877, 899 tbl.6 (2002) (recording eleven weak claims
versus two strong claims). Care quality was largely determined from the opinions of physician consultants. Id. at 884-85.

1462

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 105:1453

colleagues found an equal number of strong and weak claims. 6 And a 2006
study by David Studdert and his colleagues found only 1.3 weak cases in the

trial sample for each strong claim. 7
Taken together, the studies show a wide variety of trial mixes. The weak

cases outnumber the strong in every study but one, but the ratios range from
1.3-to-i to 9-to-1. As a result, the exact ratio of weak to strong claims re-

mains in considerable doubt. Our inability to calculate this ratio with more
specificity makes it impossible to determine from this data whether the
thirty percent plaintiff win rate typically observed in medical malpractice
cases is too high, too low, or exactly right. In order to make that determination, the verdicts in specific cases must be matched against the strength of
the evidence of negligent conduct. Fortunately, several studies have tried to
collect that data. They are reviewed in Part III.
The obvious theoretical question raised by these findings is why the mix
of malpractice cases taken to trial departs so substantially from the predic-

tions of the fifty percent hypothesis. Although scholars have offered several
promising hypotheses, the study of this question is still in its infancy. It is
hampered, no doubt, by the difficulty and expense of obtaining detailed data

about private settlement outcomes and strategies.
At present, several factors seem especially likely to account for the unusual preponderance of weak cases in the set of malpractice disputes that
reach a jury. Most obviously, malpractice litigation may not conform to one
or more of the simplifying assumptions on which the fifty percent hypothesis is built. The hypothesis incorporates assumptions that the parties have an
equal tolerance for risk, 48 that the stakes for both parties are identical,4 9 and
that they have equal access to the skills and information needed to predict
the likely outcome at trial.5 ° Each of these assumptions has been challenged
by at least one legal scholar and the failure to conform to that assumption

has been identified as the most likely cause of the low plaintiff win rate in
malpractice litigation.' Other factors that could skew the trial mix include a
46. SLOAN ET AL., supra note 20, at 167 tbl.8.2 (showing that thirty percent of the trials that
resulted in a verdict involved poor care and twenty-seven percent involved good care; the rest were
"uncertain").
47. Studdert et al., supra note 29, at 2030 tbl.2 (showing 91 claims involving an error in
treatment and 117 not involving medical error).
48.

See, e.g., Metzloff, supra note 6, at 62-63; Priest & Klein, supra note 18, at 27.

49.

See, e.g., Metzloff, supra note 6, at 63; Priest & Klein, supra note 18, at 7.

50. See Priest & Klein, supra note 18, at 13, 19; see also Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L.
Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution, 27 J. ECON. LITERATURE
1067, 1074 (1989). If the parties share an incorrect perception of what juries are likely to do, that
too will lead to verdicts that depart from a fifty-fifty split. See Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 15,
at 590; Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or Judge: Transcending Empiricism, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1124, 1131, 1156, 1170-72 (1992).
51. On unequal risk tolerance, see Farber & White, supra note 44, at 208 (concluding that
the bargaining process favors defendants because plaintiffs are more risk averse), and Stephen J.
Spurr & Walter 0. Simmons, Medical Malpractice in Michigan: An Economic Analysis, 21 J.
HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 315, 340 (1996) (attributing the difference between expected value and
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shared, but mistaken, assumption that juries will be pro-plaintiff, the incentives created by the different ways in which plaintiffs' and defendants'
lawyers are compensated,
and the unusually severe damages common in
12
malpractice cases. Although we currently lack the data needed to evaluate
the role played by each of these plausible contributing factors, the evidence
does suggest that defendants are reluctant to make settlement offers of any
size in "frivolous" cases and are anxious to settle claims backed by strong
evidence of negligence, especially if they can extract a discount from a riskaverse or less well-represented plaintiff.53 These proclivities probably explain much of the imbalance in the malpractice trial mix.
Because weak cases dominate the malpractice trial mix, the poor trial
success of malpractice plaintiffs tells us nothing about the fairness of the
jury verdicts. In this setting at least, the intuitive assumption that a fair process will produce a roughly even split in verdicts is simply wrong.
III.

JURY-EXPERT AGREEMENT

Fortunately, social scientists have attempted to measure the fairness of
jury verdicts more directly. Over the past three decades, seven studies have
compared the verdicts rendered in individual malpractice cases with independent evaluations of each claim by medical or legal experts. Although the
methodologies have varied, the studies have consistently found that the odds
of a plaintiff's verdict increase as the evidence of negligence improves. At
the same time, the studies show that the correlation between jury verdict and
expert opinion is imperfect, especially in cases in which expert reviewers
believe that the patient was injured by medical negligence.
The most common strategy used in these studies has been to compare
the jury's verdict in an individual case with the evaluation of that case made
by one or more physicians at the request of defendant's liability insurer.
While this approach poses the risk that the ratings given to the case will be
biased in favor of the defendant and, thus, will overstate the frequency of
settlement amount to either plaintiffs' risk aversion or "their disadvantage in bargaining"). On
asymmetrical stakes, see Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of Settlement
Negotiationsand the Selection of Casesfor Trial, 90 MICH. L. REv. 319, 365-66 (199 1) (suggesting
that self-esteem is an especially important reason why physicians refuse to settle weak cases, forcing plaintiffs to drop them or take them to trial); Priest & Klein, supra note 18, at 40 (stating a
"hunch" that the adverse effect of judgments on physician reputation explains the low plaintiff win
rate); and Sloan & Hsieh, supra note 32, at 1018 (suggesting that defendants and their insurers tend
to fight the defensible cases vigorously in order to preserve their reputations and avoid bad precedents). On unequal resources, see Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations
on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'y REv. 95, 97-98, 107 fig.], 110 (1974) (noting that
personal injury insurers are typically repeat players while personal injury plaintiffs are not and that
repeat players will ordinarily have greater expertise and better access to specialists), and Catherine
T. Harris et al., Who Are Those Guys?An EmpiricalExamination of Medical Malpractice Plaintiffs'
Attorneys, 58 SMU L. REV. 225, 237 (2005) (reporting that defense counsel in their sample had
handled an average of over twice as many malpractice cases as their counterparts).
52.

See Priest & Klein, supra note 18, at 39 n.77.

53.

See Peters, supra note 27, at 42-47.
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jury error, this strategy is much less expensive than paying for a truly independent review of the cases. A few important studies have avoided this
weakness by asking independent physicians to rate the quality of care given
to each plaintiff. The remainder of the studies has relied on ratings given by
insurance claims adjusters, lawyers, and presiding judges.
Although these methodological differences could potentially have affected the findings, the studies actually yielded surprisingly similar results.
Plaintiffs win about 10% to 20% of the cases with weak evidence and 50%
of the cases with strong evidence of negligence.
A. Taraginet al.

FIGURE I
TARAGIN ET AL. (PLAINTIFF WIN RATE)
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In the largest study of malpractice verdicts, Mark I. Taragin and his colleagues reviewed 976 malpractice cases that had resulted in a jury verdict
between 1978 and 1992."4 The cases came from the files of a single large
New Jersey insurance company that insured roughly 60% of the physicians
in New Jersey.
As part of its normal litigation procedure, the insurance company had
asked one or more physicians to evaluate each of these claims shortly after
its receipt. The reviewers gave each claim a rating of "defensible," "indefensible," or "unclear."55 When the Taragin team compared each evaluation with
54.

Taragin et al., supra note 39.

55. See id. at 780-81. These ratings were produced using a multi-step process. First, the
defendant-physician was contacted, and if the physician admitted error, the claim was labeled "indefensible." Otherwise, the claims representative reviewed the claim. If she deemed the claim "clearly
medically defensible," then no further review was performed. If not, a physician from the same
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the jury verdict rendered in the case, it found that the jury verdict conformed
to the insurance company's rating in 79% of the cases rated as "defensible. 56 Plaintiffs, thus, won 21% of those cases. They also won 30% of the
cases rated as "unclear," and 42% of the cases thought by the reviewers to
be "indefensible. 57
The researchers felt that the 21% discrepancy rate in cases rated as defensible could be explained by several features of the study's design:
First, the determination about physician care was made very early after a
claim was generated and may have been inaccurate as more information
became available. Second, a physician-based review process may be biased
toward assessing physician performance in the physician's favor. Third, the
insurance company may err toward an initial determination of physician
care as defensible to avoid unnecessary [settlement] payments. 8
The study, therefore, probably produced an overestimate of the number
of defensible claims. As a consequence, the researchers concluded that "our
data suggest that inappropriate payments are probably uncommon."59

specialty was chosen to give an opinion. This external reviewer discussed the case with the claims
representative, the defense attorney, and the defending physician before classifying the claim. In
orthopedic and neurosurgery cases, the process was different: a panel of outside physicians was
employed and a majority vote determined the classification. The researchers obtained the ratings
information from a standardized computer database created by the insurer. Id.
56.

Id. at 781.

57.

Id.

58. Id. at 782. They could have added two other potential sources of bias. First, the insurer
may want to maintain a favorable relationship with its customers until it becomes absolutely necessary to disagree. Second, roughly half of the cases in which the medical care was deemed defensible
were reviewed only by a claims representative, rather than by an outside physician. Id. at 781 tbl. 1.
By contrast, all initial determinations of poor quality were reviewed by consulting physicians. This
asymmetry in the evaluation procedure may have biased the ratings in favor of defendants.
59.

Id. at 782.
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B. Studdert et al.
FIGURE 2
STUDDERT ET AL. (PLAINTIFF WIN RATE)
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In a very recent study, David Studdert and his colleagues at the Harvard
School of Public Health examined the outcomes of 208 malpractice trials. 60
They located these trials in a sample of malpractice claims that had been
randomly drawn from the closed claims files of five major malpractice insurers. To reduce the risk of biased reviews, they retained their own
physicians to do the evaluations. Physicians in the relevant specialties were
hired and trained to review each file in its entirety and to determine whether
the claimant's injuries had been caused by medical error.6' No separate category for unclear cases was used.
The study found that plaintiffs won nine percent of the trials in which
the medical care had been deemed proper and forty-three percent of the
cases in which the reviewer felt that the physician had made an error
(P<0.001). 62 Evidence of negligence may also have played a role in the
jury's award of damages as plaintiffs were awarded an average of $326,009
in no-error cases and $765,486 in the cases thought to involve medical error,
even though injury severity was roughly the same (P=0.24).63

60.

Studdert et al., supra note 29.

61.
Id. at 2025. Because their sampling criteria focused on four types of clinical mishapsobstetrical, surgical, misdiagnosis, and medication-they used specialists in obstetrics, surgery, and
internal medicine. Reviewers recorded their judgments using a six-point confidence scale. The study
classified the medical care as erroneous if the claim had received a score of four or above. Id. at
2025-26. A single reviewer rated each file.
62.

Id. at 2028, 2030 tbl.2.

63.

Id. at 2030 tbl.2.
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C. Metzloff
FIGURE 3
METZLOFF (PLAINTIFF WIN RATE)
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In this study, Thomas Metzloff analyzed all the cases filed against physicians who had been insured by the three largest malpractice insurers in
North Carolina between 1984 and 1987. 64 Among the cases that had gone to
a jury verdict, he found forty-eight where the insurer's file contained an estimate of the odds of a defense verdict.65 Using these probabilities, he
divided the cases into three categories: (1) cases that the insurer felt the
plaintiff would win (odds better than 60%), (2) cases the plaintiff was likely
to lose (odds worse than 40%), and (3) "toss up" cases (where the probability estimate fell between 40% and 60%).66
When Metzloff compared the eventual jury verdicts to the insurer's predictions, he found that the plaintiffs had won one of the nineteen cases that
they were expected to lose (5%) and six of the eleven cases that they were
expected to win (55%). 6 7 They also won verdicts in four of the seventeen

64. Metzloff, supra note 6, at 45, 48. Metzloff identified all of the medical malpractice cases
filed in North Carolina's state and federal courts over a three-year period (July 1, 1984 to June 30,
1987). Id. at 47.
65.

Id. at 68.

66. Id. at 68. The principal shortcoming of the study is its apparent reliance on ratings that
were intended to predict the odds of a favorable jury verdict, rather than to assess the quality of care
given. These two metrics will not always be identical because strategic factors, like attributes of the
parties, attorneys, and witnesses, may have a bearing on the probability of success even though they
do not have a bearing on the objective merits of the case.
67.

Id. at 83 tbl.9.
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"toss up" cases (24%), but effectively lost two of those four because they
68
were awarded only nominal damages.
D. Farberand White
FIGURE

4

FARBER & WHITE (PLAINTIFF WIN RATE)
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Henry Farber and Michelle White examined the files of 252 lawsuits
against a single large hospital filed between 1977 and 1989, thirteen of
which were tried to a verdict. 69 In each case, the hospital asked multiple experts to determine whether the defendant had met the professional standard
of care. The experts who provided these evaluations included supervising
physicians, other hospital physicians in the relevant specialty, and independent physicians.70 Care was coded as "good" or "bad" if all the experts agreed
and as "ambiguous" if the reports were unclear or divided. 7' The study does
not state when the expert reports were written.
The researchers found "a strong relationship between care quality and
disposition (P-value < .0001)."71 Payments, whether due to trial verdict or
settlement, were least likely to be made in cases with good medical care,
more likely to be made in cases with ambiguous care, and most likely in
cases with bad medical care. Looking exclusively at trials, however, they
found no relationship between outcome and care quality because defendants
68.

Id. at 83 & tbl.9.

69.

Farber & White, supra note 44, at 203.

70.

Id. at 204.

71.

Id. at 204-05.

72.

Id. at 205.
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won all thirteen of the jury trials, even thoufh one involved care that had
been rated as poor and three were ambiguous.7
In a later study, Farber and White examined a larger sample of files from
the same hospital over roughly the same time period. 7' This sample had 26

jury trials, and plaintiffs won 4 of them. 76 Plaintiffs won none of the 13 trials
involving care that had been rated as "good" by the hospital's reviewers.
However, plaintiffs won 2 of the 4 trials involving medical care rated as am-

biguous (50%) and 2 of the 4 cases in which the defendant's care had been
rated as "bad" (50%). 7s The correlation between
quality of care and trial
79
outcome was statistically significant (P=0.035).

73.

Id. at 203. Twenty cases went to trial, but six were settled and one was dropped. Id. at

203 n.10.
74.

Id. at 204 tbl. 1.

75. Farber & White, supra note 43. They looked at the files of 355 complaints which had
been made to a single large hospital between 1976 and 1989 concerning the hospital or its providers
(half of which were resolved without a lawsuit) and also the files of 242 additional disputes which
were initiated by the filing of a lawsuit. Id. at 786. The researchers had available to them the files of
the hospital's patient relations office and its legal affairs office, including the opinions of the experts
asked by the hospital to assess the quality of medical care. Id. at 786-87. When informal complaints
were received, the hospital would get an evaluation from a supervisor or provider in the same specialty. When lawsuits were filed, the hospital also retained outside experts. Id. at 787.
76.

Id. at 802.

77.

Id.

78. Id. at 802, 795 tbl.6. The text indicates that plaintiffs won four cases, but then only identifies three of them. Table 6, however, indicates that two involved ambiguous care and two arose out
of bad care.
79.

Id. at 802.
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E. Daniels andAndrews
FIGURE 5
DANIELS AND ANDREWS (PLAINTIFF WIN RATE)
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In this study, Stephen Daniels and Lori Andrews reviewed the trials of
twenty-three labor and delivery cases alleging the misuse of oxytocin, a
drug used to induce labor.8 0 Because the drug had been used since 1910, the
circumstances for safe use were well understood by the medical profession.
Daniels and Andrews analyzed the trial transcripts to determine whether the
drug had been used on patients when contraindicated. They found that plaintiffs won fourteen of the sixteen trials in which evidence of
contraindications had been presented at trial (88%), 8" and only one of the
seven cases in which evidence of contraindication was absent (14%).2
While their finding of a low win rate in cases with weak evidence of negligence is consistent with the other studies, their finding that plaintiffs won
88% of the cases with poor medical care is quite unusual.

80.

Daniels & Andrews, supra note 34, at 189.

81.
All cases involving contraindications had resulted in permanent injury or death. Id. at
191. Both losses involved grave permanent injury. Id.
82.

Id. at 190.
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F. Peeples, Harris,and Metzloff
FIGURE 6
PEEPLES ET AL. (PLAINTIFF WIN RATE)
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This study examined eighteen jury verdicts from North Carolina state
courts involving claims filed between 1991 and 1995. 8' In each case, the
insurer obtained expert evaluations from one or more physicians in the same
specialty, usually from the same state. The authors used these expert reviews to divide the cases into three categories: (1) probable liability,
(2) uncertain liability (when experts disagreed), and (3) unlikely liability.
They found that plaintiffs won 10% of the trials in which the defendant's
care had been rated as good, 16.7% of the trials involving care rated as uncertain, and 50% of the trials involving care rated as poor.85

83. Peeples et al., supra note 45. The trials were culled from eighty-one closed claims files
obtained from a North Carolina teaching hospital and one of the state's principal liability insurers.
They reviewed both the entire insurance file and the court records. Id. at 881-82. The insurance files
included expert and physician review summaries as well as witness deposition summaries.
84.

Id. at 884.

85.

See id. at 888.
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G. Liang
FIGURE
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In this unusual study, Bryan Liang asked 11 anesthesiologists who practiced in an academic medical center to review 12 summaries of actual jury
trials. 16 Liang's results show that plaintiffs won 1 of the 4 cases in which the
reviewers concluded that no negligence had occurred (25%), and 4 of the 8
cases rated as having negligent care (50%)."

This study is often cited for its finding that the overall correlation between jury verdicts and physician ratings is barely better than random."
Liang reached this conclusion because the reviewers agreed with the jury

verdict in only seven of the twelve cases. Yet, this interpretation oversimplifies the insights that can be gleaned from Liang's data. On closer

examination, it is apparent that the high rate of overall disagreement in this
study was not produced by jury willingness to compensate undeserving
86. Bryan A. Liang, Assessing Medical MalpracticeJury Verdicts: A Case Study of an Anesthesiology Department, 7 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 121, 129 (1997). In five of the twelve cases,
the anesthesiologists significantly disagree with the jury's verdict. Id. The validity of the ratings
provided by the anesthesiologists turns on the even-handedness and accuracy of the case summaries
provided to them by the researchers. In addition, academic anesthesiologists may be harsher on their
peers than clinicians from other settings. The physician ratings gain strength, however, from the fact
that eleven physicians rated each case. Of course, the sample of cases is tiny.
87.

See id. at 157-160 tbls.2A, 2B, 2C, 2D, 2E & 2F

88.

Id. at 129 (finding fifty-eight percent and fifty-six percent agreement in two surveys).
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claimants, but by the reluctance of juries to render verdicts for the plaintiffs
when the evidence of negligence was strong. Liang's results show that plaintiffs lost half
S89 of the eight cases that the consulting physicians felt they
should win, while they won only one of the four cases that the reviewers
felt they should lose. 90 When the data are disaggregated in this way, they
reveal the same pattern that was observed in the larger and more reliable
studies.. Juries are more skeptical than medical reviewers of medical malpractice lawsuits.
H. Judge-JuryAgreement
No studies have compared the verdicts reached by juries in medical
malpractice cases with the verdicts that the presiding judges would have
recommended. However, a number of important studies have examined the
judge-jury agreement rate in personal injury lawsuits more generally. The
most famous and largest of these studies was undertaken in the 1960s by
Harry Kalven and Hans Zeisel. 9' They reviewed approximately 4000 civil
trials and found that the judge and jury agreed in 78% of them. 9' When they
looked only at personal injury cases, they found a similar rate of agreement.93 A more recent, but much smaller, study by Larry Heuer and Steven
Penrod examined 67 civil trials from 33 states and found agreement in
71.4% percent of the cases. 94
Kalven and Zeisel also analyzed the cases in which judge and jury had
disagreed to ascertain whether these disagreements reflected systematic favoritism toward one side or another. The judge and jury had disagreed in
22% of the cases and those disagreements were about evenly split between
cases in which the jury rendered a verdict for the plaintiff (12%) and those
in which the jury found for the defendant (10%). 9' Heuer and Penrod did a
similar analysis with similar results. In the cases on which judge and jury
had disagreed (37% of the total set of cases), judges disagreed with jury
89.

Id. at 129, 157-160 tbts.2A, 2B, 2C, 2D, 2E & 2F; cf id. at 135 (finding that respondents

were "extremely critical of the defendant" physicians).
90.

See supranote 88.

91.

HARRY KALVEN, JR.

92.

Id. at 63.

&

HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY

(1966).

93. Id. at 64 n.12.
94. Larry Heuer & Steven Penrod, Trial Complexity: A Field Investigation of Its Meaning
and Effects, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 29, 48 tbl. 13 (1994). In addition, researchers have found similar rates of judge-jury agreement in criminal trials. See, e.g., KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 91, at 58
tbl. 12 (78%); Heuer & Penrod, supra, at 48 tbl. 12 (73%). Two other surveys of judicial opinion have
found similar or higher estimates of the rate of judge-jury agreement. See John B. Attanasio, Forward: Juries Rule, 54 SMU L. REV. 1681, 1684 (2001); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., The Georgia Jury and
Negligence: The View from the Bench, 26 GA. L. REV. 85, 97-98 (1991); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., The
GeorgiaJury and Negligence: The View from the (Federal)Bench, 27 GA. L. REV. 59, 70-71 (1992)
[hereinafter Sentell, Federal Bench].
95.

KALVEN &

ZEISEL,

supra note 91, at 63-65.
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defense verdicts (19%) as frequently as they disagreed with jury verdicts for
plaintiffs (18%).96
Thus, the judge-jury agreement rate in tort cases is even stronger than
the jury-reviewer agreement rate observed in the medical malpractice studies previously discussed, especially in the cases that jurors feel have strong
evidence of negligence. These reassuring findings are also consistent with
the many surveys
that have found that judges generally hold a positive view
97
of the jury.

It would be even more informative, of course, if these studies had separately reported the judge-jury agreement rate for medical malpractice cases.
Because they did not, the only studies that shed light on the judge-jury
agreement in medical malpractice cases are the few that have compared how
judges and juries decide the malpractice cases that are actually assigned to
them. When Kevin Clermont and Theodore Eisenberg looked at the win
rates for all federal civil trials between 1979 and 1989, they found that malpractice claimants had significantly less success in front of juries than they
had before judges. 98 While malpractice plaintiffs won 50% of their bench
trials, they won only 29% of their jury trials." The findings of the Bureau of
Justice Statistics, using 2001 data from the country's 75 largest counties,
were very similar. The Bureau found that medical malpractice plaintiffs won
50% of their bench trials but only 26% of their jury trials.'0
Overall, malpractice plaintiffs appear to win half as often in front of juries as they do in front of judges. This sizeable discrepancy rate is atypical
of most personal injury litigation. In most civil litigation, other than malpractice and product liability litigation, Clermont and Eisenberg found that
bench and jury success rates were roughly the same.' The Bureau findings
also suggest that malpractice litigation is unusual. The judge-jury discrepancy rate was much larger in medical malpractice cases than it was in civil
litigation generally (24% compared to 14%).'0 2 These findings raise the possibility that juries are more deferential to physicians and more skeptical of
patients who sue them than judges are.
96.

Heuer & Penrod, supra note 94, at 48 tbl. 13.

97. In the Kalven and Zeisel study, for example, the judges typically believed that a jury that
decided the case differently had reached a reasonable decision. See Vidmar, American Civil Jury,
supra note 10, at 853. A Georgia survey of state and federal judges found 94% of the judges felt the
jury understood the case, and 87% believed that juries are not pro-plaintiff. Sentell, FederalBench,
supra note 94, at 116 tbls.16 & 17. All of the federal judges and 98% of the state judges felt that
jury performance was satisfactory or would be if some procedural reforms were adopted. Id. at 117
tbl. 18. Over 97% of both groups said that they agreed with jury verdicts more often than was reported in the Kalven and Zeisel study. Id. at 115 tbl. 14.
98.

Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 50, at 1137, 1174.

99.

Id. at 1137.

100. THOMAS H. COHEN, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Tort Trials and Verdicts, in Large Counties, 2001, at 4 tbl. 3, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ttvlcOl.pdf.
101.

Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 50, at 1137.

102.

COHEN,

supra note 100, at 4 tbl. 3. (finding 65 versus 51% in civil litigation generally).
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Still, it would be a mistake to give significant weight to the studies comparing bench trials with jury trials because we do not know whether
malpractice attorneys systematically direct a different mix of malpractice
cases to judges than to juries.' °3 Because the difference in win rates could
simply reflect a different mix of cases, the studies comparing bench trial
outcomes with jury trial outcomes provide a less appropriate basis for
evaluating jury performance than the studies that compare jury verdicts with
the verdicts that judges or experts would have reached in the same cases.

I. Synthesis of the Findings
FIGURE 8
CARE QUALITY AND TRIAL OUTCOME
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The studies that compare jury verdicts with the conclusions reached by
experts are startlingly consistent. Each indicates that the probability of a
plaintiff's verdict grows as the evidence of negligence improves. Patients
with claims that the reviewers believe to be weak are highly unlikely to win
a jury verdict. Patients with "close" cases are roughly twice as likely to win
their cases as those with weak cases. Finally, patients with strong evidence
of negligence are the most likely to prevail before a jury. These findings are
collected in Figure 8.
The studies also consistently find that juries are deferential to physicians. While they are very likely to find for the defendant when the
103.

See Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 50, at 1174.
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reviewers believe that the plaintiff's evidence is weak, they are just as likely
to find for the defendant as for the plaintiff when the evidence of negligence
is strong. Thus, juries are several times more likely to depart from the judgment of the reviewers when doing so will exonerate the defendant than they
are to disagree when doing so will lead to liability. The jury verdicts in cases
rated as toss-ups also show this deference. Despite expert ratings consistent
with a fifty-fifty split in the verdicts, juries rendered defense verdicts in
about seventy percent of the cases. The repeated finding that juries rule in
favor of defendant physicians more often than physician reviewers do is
remarkable given the documented reluctance of physicians to label another
physician's care as neghgent.
To the extent that jury bias in favor of plaintiffs is the perceived danger,
these findings should be reassuring. The studies show that juries favor doctors even more than physician reviewers do. The empirical literature,
therefore, does not support the view that juries are biased in favor of injured
plaintiffs and are easily manipulated by plaintiffs' lawyers.
Furthermore, the consistency of these findings across multiple studies
offsets the otherwise legitimate concern that most of these studies are small.
Moreover, researchers reached similar results despite differences in the
population of cases being examined and in the choice of reviewers. Some
studies were state-specific and others national. Some targeted selected clinical specialties, and some did not. Some had multiple reviewers, while others
relied on a single reader. Most used the ratings of physician reviewers, but
some relied on the opinions of lawyers, judges, or insurance company
claims evaluators. Some used two categories (negligent or not) to classify
the quality of care rendered, and others added a third category for toss-up
cases. Yet the consistency of their findings is extraordinary. Juries favor defendants.
Although these findings should be welcomed by physicians, the fit between external ratings and jury verdicts is not perfect. Plaintiffs win some of
the cases that raters think they should lose. In the largest study, this rate
reached twenty-one percent.' °5 To be sure, that study took place before the
media campaign of the past decade. A 2006 study with the second largest
sample found only a nine percent plaintiff win rate in the cases experts rated
as lacking merit, despite the fact that this study used a two-category design
which allocated half of the close cases to the no-merit category. Still, doctors facing the risk of an adverse judgment that could materially change
their lives may see a ten to twenty percent "error" rate as catastrophic. Plaintiffs have an even stronger basis for complaining about the current rate of
disagreement. They lose fully half of the trials that expert reviewers feel

104.

See infra text accompanying note 110.

105. See Liang, supra note 86. Although the discrepancy rate in the Liang study was twentyfive percent, that entire rate was attributable to a single discrepant verdict. The study examined only
twelve cases.
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they should win, along with most of the close cases. What accounts for these
disagreements is the subject of Part IV.
IV. DISAGREEMENT

This Part examines the factors most likely to explain the observed discrepancies between jury verdicts and the ratings given by external
reviewers. The most plausible explanations include inter-rater variability,
reviewer bias, asymmetric information, scientific complexity, procedural
restrictions on the ascertainment of truth, jury bias, unequal litigation resources, and the burden of proof. The discussion which follows examines
each of these potential influences and offers a working hypothesis that most
of the discrepancies between jury verdicts and external reviews are produced by a combination of inter-rater variability, jury respect for the burden
of proof, jury reluctance to hold physicians liable, and superior defense resources.
A. Inter-RaterVariability

Whenever individuals are asked to evaluate the quality of someone else's
performance, a certain amount of disagreement is inevitable. Even when
researchers ask physicians to rate the quality of care provided by other physicians, the participants disagree among themselves. The frequency of these
disagreements is surprisingly high. Several studies, including the Harvard
Study of New York Hospitals and a more recent study by Peeples, Harris,
and Metzloff, have found that physicians who evaluate the quality of care
provided by other physicians disagree in about 30% of the cases.' 6 Reasonable professionals often reach different conclusions about the same
evidence.
In a fascinating review of the literature, Shari Diamond collected data on
the agreement rates of people who make complex decisions in a variety of
other settings. She found that a disagreement rate of 25%-30% was persistent across all fields. The disagreement rate for scientists engaged in peer
review was 25%, the rate for employment interviewers was 30%, for psychiatrists diagnosing psychiatric illness it was also 30%, and for physicians
diagnosing physical illness it was 23%-34%.107 Diamond and Hans Zeisel
found a similar rate of disagreement among judges. In their study of the recommendations of judges participating in sentencing councils, they found a

106. See, e.g., Farber & White, supra note 44, at 204-05 (finding 30% disagreement or ambiguous findings); Peeples et al., supra note 45, at 884 (finding that reviewers disagreed in 34.3% of
the cases).
107. Shari Seidman Diamond, Orderin the Court: Consistency in Criminal-CourtDecisions,
in 2 THE MASTER LECTURE SERIES: PSYCHOLOGY AND THE LAW 119, 125 (C. James Scheirer &
Barbara L. Hammonds eds., 1982).
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30% or greater rate of disagreement on whether the offender should be sentenced to prison.' °8
It is now well established that a modest, but significant, level of disagreement is inherent in the nature of performance assessment. That is
hardly surprising, given the frequent presence of disputed facts and the subjective nature of quality assessment. In medicine, the potential for
disagreement is further compounded by frequent uncertainty among physicians and regional variation over the appropriate standard of care.' °9
Consequently, a significant fraction of the jury-reviewer disagreements
may be inherent in the nature of these decisions. The studies suggest that
normal inter-rater variability causes discrepancy rates of roughly 25% to
30%. Yet, the discrepancy rate in the malpractice cases with relatively weak
evidence of negligence is only 10% to 20%. Because a certain level of interobserver disagreement is inevitable, and because the discrepancy rate observed in malpractice cases is much lower than the rate found in other
settings, virtually all the disagreement between juries and reviewers occurring in cases with relatively weak evidence of negligence is probably the
product of routine inter-observer variability. In this set of cases, jury performance is exceptional.
At the same time, further improvement is both possible and desirable.
Courts should continue to experiment with innovative efforts to make scientific proof more comprehensible to lay jurors, such as early jury instruction,
jury note-taking, ongoing jury deliberations, and jury submission of questions. They should also continue their search for better ways to distinguish
legitimate experts from professional actors. However, the relatively high
agreement rate that already exists between juries and physician-reviewers in
low-odds cases probably means that only a modest improvement is possible.
By contrast, inter-rater variability provides a much less complete explanation for the disagreement rate in cases with strong evidence of negligence.
The fifty percent discrepancy rate found in these cases means that additional
factors are at work.
B. Reviewer Bias

Another possible explanation for jury-reviewer disagreement is that the
physicians whose ratings were used by the studies were biased in favor of
the defendant physicians. Research has shown that physicians are very reluctant to label the conduct of another physician as negligent. One study
found a "pronounced reluctance to label as negligent those treatment deci-

108. Shari Seidman Diamond & Hans Zeisel, Sentencing Councils: A Study of Sentence Disparityand its Reduction, 43 U. CHi. L. REV. 109, 119-20 (1975).
109.

See David M. Eddy, Variations in Physician Practice: The Role of Uncertainty, 3
74 (1984) (outlining the sources of uncertainty); Philip G. Peters, Jr., The Role of the
Jury in Modem MalpracticeLaw, 87 IOWA L. REV. 909, 946-48 (2002) (reviewing the evidence).
HEALTH AFF.
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sions that, ex post at least, were clearly erroneous." "" When faced with scenarios that had been previously judged by a panel of senior physicians to be
clearly negligent, only thirty percent of the participants in the study said that
the patients should receive compensation. In the Farber and White study, the
risk of bias was even more acute because some of the raters were coworkers and supervisors of the defendants.
In addition, the processes used by insurance companies to rate the quality of claims against their insureds are often skewed in favor of the insured.
For example, some insurance companies take more precautions to avoid an
erroneous attribution of negligence to their insured than they do to prevent
an erroneous exoneration."' In addition, the fact that many major insurers
are physician-sponsored corporations increases the risk that the claims adjustment process will favor physicians.
However, the jury verdict data simply do not substantiate the fear that
pro-physician bias is a significant cause of jury-reviewer disagreement. If
the reviewers' ratings reflected a substantial pro-physician bias, we would
expect to see a high jury disagreement rate in cases rated by the reviewers as
lacking merit. That is because less biased juries would be expected to rule
for the plaintiffs in a significant fraction of these cases. Pro-defendant reviewer bias should also produce a low rate of disagreement in the cases
rated as having merit because reviewers would give that rating only when
negligence was indisputable. Yet, the studies show a dramatically different
pattern of disagreement. They reveal that disagreement is most common in
the cases rated as having merit and least common in cases rated as lacking
merit. This pattern is inconsistent with the presence of systematic prodefendant bias in the external reviews. That, in turn, makes it unlikely that
we can explain a significant fraction of the plaintiffs' verdicts in low-odds
cases as the jury's correction of a biased rating.
C. Asymmetric and Incomplete Information
Both juries and expert reviewers rely on incomplete information. The
evidence available to the external reviewers, in particular, will often be less
complete than the evidence produced at trial. It may also be more one-sided.

110. PAUL C. WEILER ET AL., A MEASURE OF MALPRACTICE 125 (1993) ("We found marked
variation among physicians in their willingness to label certain kinds of medical outcomes as iatrogenic, and an even more pronounced reluctance to label as negligent those treatment decisions that,
ex post at least, were clearly erroneous.").
111.
See Peeples et al., supra note 45, at 884 (finding that the liability insurer was more likely
to seek additional reviewers if the initial review suggested breach of duty than if that review exonerated the sued physician). The insurer's average number of reviews grew from 3.07 to 3.27 and then
to 4.43 as the evidence of breach got stronger. See id. The authors concluded "that the insurer proceeds more carefully in those cases in which liability appears likely." Id. Similarly, in the Taragin
study, only about half of the cases in which the medical care was initially deemed defensible by a
claims representative were reviewed by an outside physician, while all initial determinations of poor
quality were reviewed by consulting physicians. See Taragin et al., supra note 39, at 781 tbl.l
(deeming twenty-nine percent defensible with "[nio peer review").
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The hospital chart, for example, is controlled by prospective defendants and
may paint a very different picture than the story that emerges when all of the
witnesses have testified." 2 If so, juries can be expected to disagree occasionally with the ratings given by insurance reviewers.
At present, however, we do not know whether a significant fraction of
the jury-reviewer disagreements arises out of access to different information
about the patient's treatment. Given the strong agreement rate in low-odds
cases, however, it is unlikely that pro-defendant ratings errors caused by
incomplete information are as large a problem as many observers would
have expected. Instead, the more interesting question is whether, contrary to
expectation, the jury's access to more complete information helps to explain
why the jury finds for the plaintiff in only fifty percent of the cases that the
reviewers rated as indefensible. We currently lack the data needed to answer
that question.
D. Scientific Complexity

Many critics of jury decision-making charge that juries are unable to understand complex medical evidence. Doctors fear that the ensuing confusion
works to the plaintiffs' advantage, making the jurors vulnerable to manipulation by plaintiffs' attorneys, sympathetic plaintiffs, and dishonest expert
witnesses. Although several studies have attempted to determine the jury's
capacity to digest complex evidence and to decide difficult cases fairly, the
results have been inconclusive.
Some of the findings are reassuring." 3 For example, researchers have
found that greater case complexity does not produce more disagreement
between juries and presiding judges." 4 In the largest and most famous of the
studies, Kalven and Zeisel concluded that their findings of strong judge-jury
agreement were "a5 stunning refutation of the hypothesis that the jury does
not understand."'
At the same time, other studies have documented the limitations of a lay
jury in complex cases." 6 The most clearly established weakness lies in the
112. See VIDMAR, supra note 4, at 59-67 (containing case studies that reveal how estimates of
case strength change as information is uncovered).
113. See, e.g., Vidmar, Are Juries Competent, supra note 10 (reviewing the literature and
concluding that juries are competent to decide scientific tort cases).
114. See, e.g., Diamond & Rose, supra note 16, at 271 (collecting and reviewing the studies);
Neil Vidmar & Shari Seidman Diamond, Juries and Expert Evidence, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 1121
(2001).
115. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 91, at 157 ("While, as we can see, jury disagreement is
greater in close cases than in clear ones, there is virtually no difference between the frequency of
disagreement when the case is easy and when the case is difficult.").
116. See, e.g., Joe S. Cecil et al., Citizen Comprehension of Difficult Issues: Lessons from
Civil Jury Trials, 40 Am.U. L. REV. 727, 755-60 (1991) (reviewing the literature); Joseph Sanders,
Scientifically Complex Cases, Trial by Jury, and the Erosion of Adversarial Processes, 48 DEPAUL
L. REv. 355, 365 (1998) (concluding that the research shows jurors have trouble comprehending
complex evidence).
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comprehension and application of probabilistic evidence." 7 For example,
• 118
people tend to overestimate the significance of some low probability risks.
This could cause them to overestimate, in hindsight, the riskiness of a physician's clinical decisions.
Although the literature on jury comprehension is voluminous and far
more nuanced that this brief summary can reflect, it provides neither a basis
for concluding that juries commonly err in medical malpractice cases nor a
basis for concluding that they do not. Perhaps the most revealing data comes
from the studies on jury-reviewer agreement. The exceptionally high rate of
agreement between juries and physician reviewers in the low-odds cases is
inconsistent with the theory that the case complexity produces unfair plaintiffs' verdicts.
In fact, the studies on jury-reviewer agreement raise the surprising possibility that case complexity favors defendants. As will be discussed further
below, the complexity and ambiguity of the scientific evidence in conjunction with the burden of proof could explain why juries find for defendants in
half of the cases rated by experts as indefensible and in seventy percent of
the borderline cases. Juries may be reluctant to hold a defendant liable when
jurors are uncertain or confused about the evidence.
E. ProceduralBarriers to the Ascertainment of Truth
Our adversary system relies on the parties to produce all of the relevant
evidence for the jury. Yet, the parties actually have a very different objective.
They are trying to prevail in a zero-sum game." 9 Neither is interested in presenting the "whole" truth. Instead, each presents a partial picture that it
hopes will be taken as the truth. This objective aligns awkwardly with the
jury's twin goals of ascertaining the truth and reaching a just verdict.
The obstacles placed in the search for truth are not limited to the system's reliance on the parties to adduce the evidence. The civil justice system
impedes the search for truth in other ways as well. Consider, for example,
the protection of attorney work-product and the many restrictions placed on
access to information about experts consulted by an opposing party, some of
whom may have opinions inconsistent with that party's theory of the case.120
117. See Reid Hastie & W. Kip Viscusi, What Juries Can't Do Well: The Jurys Performance
as a Risk Manager, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 901,909-10 (1998) (reviewing the psychological literature).
118. See David L. Faigman & A.J. Baglioni, Jr., Bayes' Theorem in the Trial Process: Instructing Jurors on the Value of Statistical Evidence, 12 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 1 (1988) (finding that
mock jurors underestimated the Bayesian significance of statistical evidence about blood typing);
Brian C. Smith et al., Jurors' Use of Probabilistic Evidence, 20 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 49, 60-70
(1996). See generally Cecil et al., supra note 116, at 755-60 (reviewing the literature).
119.

Joel Levin, Tort Talk, 40 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 1019, 1020(2005).

120. The work of Stephen Easton maps out some of that territory. E.g., Stephen D. Easton,
That Is Not All There Is: Enhancing Daubert Exclusion by Applying "Ordinary" Witness Principles
to Experts, 84 NEB. L. REV. 675 (2006); Stephen D. Easton, "Red Rover, Red Rover, Send That Expert Right Over": Clearing the Way for Parties to Introduce the Testimony of Their Opponents'
Expert Witnesses, 55 SMU L. REv. 1427 (2002); Stephen D. Easton, Can We Talk?: Removing
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In situations like these, where courts have placed the protection of other
important values above an unfettered search for the truth, the process itself
may place an upper limit on the accuracy of its outcomes. As a result, the
incentives and rules of the adversary process may produce some of the cases
in which juries and extra-judicial reviewers disagree. '
However, the relatively low discrepancy rate in the low-odds cases suggests that any reforms enacted to improve the process, such as refinements
in the rules governing expert witnesses, will have at most a very modest effect on that set of cases. Yet those are the cases that most concern the critics
of tort law.
F. Jury Bias

Jury bias, like reviewer bias, could explain some of the cases in which
juries and reviewers disagree. Jury bias in favor of injured claimants could
be responsible for some of the low-odds cases that plaintiffs win. At the
same time, other juries may be biased in favor of medical defendants, potentially explaining much of the success that defendants have in cases rated as
toss-ups or indefensible.
Unfortunately, the role played by jury bias in malpractice cases has not
been measured directly. Nevertheless, the studies of jury-reviewer agreement provide some promising clues about the role that jury bias plays in
malpractice litigation. First, the low level of jury-reviewer disagreement in
low-odds cases suggests that pro-plaintiff jury bias produces very few indefensible plaintiffs' verdicts. Second, the surprising level of defense success
in cases deemed indefensible by expert reviewers cannot be explained by
inter-rater variability alone. As a result, jury verdicts in these cases must be
driven by one or more factors that systematically favor defendants at trial.
Pro-defendant jury bias is one of the likely factors, along with the defense's
superior resources, and jury respect for the burden of proof.
The possibility that juries are biased in favor of physicians runs counter
to conventional wisdom. Juries, we are told, sympathize with injured patients and penalize wealthy physician defendants. However, jury reticence to
hold physicians liable is consistent with public opinion research indicating
that the public is deeply concerned about excessive litigation and high liability insurance premiums. '1 2 In one study, four of five potential jurors agreed
Counterproductive Ethical Restraints Upon Ex Parte Communication Between Attorneys and Adverse Expert Witnesses, 76 IND. L.J. 647 (2001).
121. However, studies comparing adversarial and inquisitorial styles of adjudication suggest
that no major gains would be achieved by moving toward a more European model. See Diamond &
Rose, supra note 16 (reviewing the literature). Each system has its own shortcomings.
122. See VIDMAR, supra note 4, at 171; David M. Engel, The Oven Bird's Song: Insiders,
Outsiders,and Personal Injuries in an American Community, 18 LAW & Soc'v REV. 551, 553, 55961 (1984) (finding that citizens in a rural Illinois county disapproved of "cashing in" via personal
injury lawsuits and characterized those who did sue as "people looking for the easy buck"); Edith
Greene et al., Jurors'AttitudesAbout Civil Litigation and the Size of Damage Awards, 40 AM. U. L.
REV. 805, 809 (1991); Valerie P. Hans & William S. Lofquist, Jurors'Judgmentsof Business Liabil-
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that "[p]eople are too quick to sue" and that "[t]here are far too many frivolous lawsuits today."'' 2 3 Only one-third felt that "[m]ost people who sue

others in court have legitimate grievances."' 24 In Texas, lawyers report that
the "going rate" for settlement of tort claims has gone down. 21 In Wisconsin, defendants are now requesting jury trials in soft tissue cases.16
This mood of public skepticism extends to lawsuits against physicians.

In his study of potential jurors, Neil Vidmar found that members of the jury
pool often made remarks during voir dire revealing their skepticism about
malpractice litigation. Many made comments like "too many people sue
their doctors" and "it is just going to raise the health insurance rates for the
rest of us.' ' 27 In another study of potential jurors, one-third of the respondents believed that medical malpractice plaintiffs were looking for easy
money.

2

'

Respondents were even more skeptical of plaintiffs' lawyers. Two-

29
thirds felt that these lawyers pressured clients into suing their doctors.,

Many felt
that medical malpractice litigation was ruining the health care
30
system.1

widespread skepticism toward claimants and protectiveness towardThisphysicians
could have several causes, including (1) the media
ityin Tort Cases: Implications for the Litigation Explosion Debate, 26 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 85
(1992); ELLEN L. LEGGETT, JURY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, IDENTIFYING JUROR BIAS AND THEIR
IMPACT ON CASES (1999) (finding that one-third of the respondents believed that medical malpractice plaintiffs are looking for easy money). Medical sociologists also point out that a low win rate is
to be expected when lower status individuals make demands on persons with higher social status.
See Jeffery Mullis, Medical Malpractice, Social Structure,and Social Control, 10 Soc. F. 135, 142,
145, 149 (1995).
123. Hans & Lofquist, supra note 122, at 93. This study asked about tort cases against corporations.
124. Id. Some of the skepticism about plaintiffs may be the product of cognitive dissonancewe do not want to think poorly of the people to whom we entrust our lives and well-being. Another
possible explanation has been suggested by medical sociologists who believe that the poor success
of malpractice plaintiffs in court is a predictable consequence of their lower social status relative to
physicians. See Mullis, supra note 122, at 142, 145, 149.
125. Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, It Was the Best of limes, It Was the Worst of imes:
The PrecariousNature of Plaintiffs'Practicein Texas, 80 TEx. L. REV. 1781, 1783, 1796 (2002).
126.

HERBERT

M.

KRITZER, RISKS, REPUTATIONS, AND REWARDS: CONTINGENCY FEE LEGAL

PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES

300 n.33 (2004) (reporting on anecdotal statements by counsel).

127.

VIDMAR,

128.

LEGGETT, supra note 122.

supra note 4, at 169.

129. Id.; see also Greene et al., supra note 122, at 817 (finding that most jurors believe attorneys encourage people to file frivolous lawsuits).
130.

See LEGGETr, supra note 122 (discussing the findings).
131.
Further complicating this analysis is the realistic possibility that jury bias may vary materially from one locale to another. We know already that plaintiffs' win rates vary substantially
across the country and even across states. See, e.g., Mary R. Rose & Neil Vidmar, The Bronx "Bronx
Jury": A Profile of Civil Jury Awards in New York Counties, 80 TEx. L. REV. 1889, 1896 (2002)
(studying the so-called "Bronx effect" and finding that Bronx County ties with Brooklyn for the
highest plaintiff win rate in the metropolitan New York area-at or above 50%); DANIELS &
MARTIN, supra note 3, at 139 tbl.4.6 (finding that the win rate in Dallas was roughly 20% from
1970 to 1990, while the win rate in Cook County, Illinois, went from 42% down to 26% and then
back up to 41% over the same time period). However, no study has attempted to separate the role
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campaigns undertaken to create a political climate favorable to tort and malpractice reform legislation, (2) "Main Street" social norms against playing
the tort lottery, and (3) the credibility, authority, and trustworthiness that are
commonly attributed to high-status positions, like physicians.
1. Media
Most obviously, the media coverage of three medical malpractice crises
in the mid- 1970s, mid-1980s, and early 2000s has made the public very sensitive to the costs of malpractice litigation. On the heels of those crises, the
political and public-relations campaigns in support of reform legislation
further shaped public perceptions. In Texas, for example, the settlement
the tort reform movement has
because
value of tort cases has declined
32
•
changed the courtroom environment.
In their important study of the public tort reform debate, Stephen
Daniels and Joanne Martin point out that rhetoric is often more important
than reality.' Critics of tort law have mastered that rhetoric far better than
its defenders. Cumulatively, they have created a widely shared picture of
juries who are biased in favor of injured claimants and who pick the pockets
defendants in order to provide the claimants with generous recovof insured
34
eries. 1
2. Social Norms Against Claiming
A question not yet asked in the malpractice literature is why the public
has been so receptive to this message. The answer may lie in norms about
claiming. Many Americans have decidedly mixed feelings about tort claimants. While they are sympathetic to people who have been badly injured,
many are also uncomfortable with attempts to "profit" from that injury.
These underling attitudes toward tort litigation were first revealed by the
pioneering work of David Engel. His 1984 article The Oven Bird's Song'35
summarized two years of fieldwork studying community attitudes toward
personal injury litigation in a small, predominantly rural Illinois county he
called "Sander County."' 36 Although personal injury litigation rates were low
played by local norms from the role played by regional differences in the kinds of cases that are
selected for trial. Thus, plaintiffs may win more verdicts than they should in some communities and
less in others. If so, the unexpected plaintiffs' verdicts found in the jury verdict studies may be concentrated in different venues than those that produce the unexpected defendants' verdicts.
132. See generally Daniels & Martin, supra note 125 (reporting on interviews with many
plaintiffs' lawyers).
133.

DANIELS & MARTIN,

134.

Id. at ll.

supra note 3, at 2.

135. Engel, supra note 122. Engel did his fieldwork between 1978 and 1980. Id. at 557 (describing his data gathering methods).
136. Id. at 552. Although more than half of the population lived in the county seat, agriculture
continued to play a central role in county life. Id. at 554.
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there, residents of Sander County strongly disapproved of personal injury
lawsuits. Claimants were characterized
as "very greedy," "quick to sue," and
37
"looking for the easy buck."'1
Engel found the explanation for these beliefs in the culture of Sander
County. Residents shared a brand of individualism that emphasized selfsufficiency and personal responsibility. In this farming community, the
risk of injury was ever-present. 3 9 People were expected to "provide their

own protection against injuries" and "absorb the consequences of harms
they fail[ed] to ward off."' 4 Money was earned through hard work, not the
courts. Against this norm of stoicism, "cashing in" on misfortune was considered highly inappropriate.' 4 Most local residents were hesitant to file
lawsuits. 42 When they took a case to court, awards were low and suspicion

of plaintiffs high. 14 Jurors felt that they had been "out there slaving away for
every penny they've got and they [weren't] about to just give it away to
make that free gift to anybody."'"
Social attitudes like these could provide at least a partial explanation for
the difficulty that malpractice plaintiffs frequently experience in jury trials.
It would be easy to dismiss the "Sander County" views as those of an isolated and small rural community many years ago, but that would be unwise.
The last quarter century has seen a resurgence of voter support for politicians seeking to reinvigorate "traditional" social values like those held in

Sander County. 4 This broader political zeitgeist may spill over into jury
deliberations. 46 For community members who share these values, tort reform may closely resemble welfare reform, each ending an era of unearned

137.

Id.at 553.

138.

Id. at 558-59.

139.

Id.
at 558.

140. Id. at 558-59. For the traditionalists, transforming an injury into a lawsuit was "an attempt to escape responsibility." Id. at 559.
141.
Id. at 559. The community treated contract lawsuits far more approvingly. Contract actions, usually involving collections for sales, services, or loans, were nearly ten times as common in
Sander County as personal injury lawsuits. Id. at 574-75. Yet community members voiced no complaints about this litigation as it enforced the sanctity of a promise. As one person observed, "a
farmer's word is good." Id. at 576. Contract actions insured that promises were kept, debts honored,
and payment received for work performed. Id. (noting that even violent self-help by creditors was
tolerated). As a consequence, contract actions reinforced the existing social order, while tort claims
challenged it.
142. Id. at 561. When they wanted to file a claim, it was hard to find a local lawyer willing to
take the case. Although members of the local bar filed 72.5% of all non-tort lawsuits in the county,
they filed only 12.5% of the personal injury claims. Id. at 565.
143.

Id. at 560.

144.

Id. (quoting an insurance adjuster).

145. In addition, now, as then, contract litigation is growing more rapidly than tort litigation.
Malpractice lawsuits are actually declining on a per capita basis.
146. See Ted Schneyer, Empirical Research with a Policy Payoff: Market Dynamics for Lawyers Who Represent Plaintiffsfor a Contingent Fee, 80 TEx. L. REV. 1829, 1836 (2002) (pointing
out the potential role of Texas politics on decreases in the going settlement rate).
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Where these views are prevalent, plaintiffs will face a demand48

ing burden of proof.1

3. Challenging PrivilegedMembers of Society

Malpractice claimants also face another potential barrier to success that
differentiates malpractice lawsuits from most other categories of tort litigation. Patients who file malpractice claims directly challenge the competency

and authority of an upstanding member of the community with high social
standing. A theory in legal sociology called "status expectations theory"
contends "that the influence attempts of high-status individuals succeed, and
those of lower-status people fail, due to socially shared cognitions and ex-

pectations that link social status to attributions about personal ability and
worth.', 49 Higher-status individuals have more cultural capital than individustatus because of cultural beliefs about their character and
als with •lower
150

reputation.
This theory was first formally articulated in 1976 by Donald Black, who
argued that the relative social standing of the defendant and his victim significantly influence the outcome of both criminal and civil cases."'
Marshaling the studies then available, he claimed that low-status individuals

who injure high-status victims are treated more harshly by the law than
high-status individuals who injure low-status victims. He also believed that

147. This particularly American brand of individualism probably helps explain why the pleas
of tort reformers have resonated so strongly with the public. Advocates of tort reform have chosen
their terms wisely. Complaints about "frivolous claims," "lottery mentality," and "windfall recovery"
are likely to have considerable salience for Americans who share the creed of individualism and
self-sufficiency.
148. Further complicating this analysis is the realistic possibility that the direction of jury bias
varies with locality. Usually, defendants favor rural juries and plaintiffs favor urban. Because local
norms and attitudes vary, plaintiffs may win more verdicts than they should in some communities
and less than they should in others. Thus far, however, there is no useful data on this topic because
the few studies comparing local win rates have not controlled for case quality. See, e.g., DANIELS &
MARTIN, supra note 3, at 127; Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, Trial Outcomes and Demographics: Is There a Bronx Effect?, 80 TEx. L. REV. 1839 (2002); Mary R. Rose & Neil Vidmar, The
Bronx "Bronx Jury": A Profile of Civil Jury Awards in New York Counties, 80 TEx. L. REv. 1889,
1896 (2002). If the folklore is correct, however, the data on jury-reviewer disagreement suggests that
the rural counties favored by defendants may be just as unfair to plaintiffs as urban juries reputedly
are to defendants.
149.

Karyl A. Kinsey & Loretta J. Stalans, Which "Haves " Come Out Ahead and Why?, in IN

LITIGATION: DO THE "HAVES" STILL COME OUT AHEAD? 137, 140 (Herbert M. Kritzer & Susan S.

Silbey eds., 2003).
150.

Id.

151.
DONALD BLACK, THE BEHAVIOR OF LAW 11 (1976) [hereinafter BLACK, BEHAVIOR]. See
generally DONALD BLACK, SOCIOLOGICAL JUSTICE (1989) [hereinafter BLACK, SOCIOLOGICAL JUS-

TICE].
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the more intimate the personal relationship between the defendant and the
victim, the less harshly the defendant would be treated.'52
The reception of Black's theory has been mixed. Some studies confirm
his predictions, but others do not."' In addition, the applicability of this research to malpractice trials remains uncertain because nearly all of it
involves criminal justice and race, rather than civil liability and occupational
privilege. The impact of social status on malpractice outcomes is further
complicated by the possibility that malpractice plaintiffs can materially raise
their effective social standing by retaining attorneys and experts with better
social pedigree than their own. 54 As a result, we lack the data needed to
know whether the social standing of physicians explains any of the surprising success that physicians have when the evidence against them is strong,
but the social status of the patient is not.
Despite these uncertainties, however, there are good reasons for leaving
open the possibility that social status affects malpractice outcomes. Most
importantly, the gulf in social power and prestige between physicians and
ordinary patients is massive.'55 This chasm provides ample raw material for
the operation of subtle differences in the attribution of credibility and authority to doctors and patients. The tendency to favor the doctor may be
further deepened by the social relationship out of which the lawsuits arise.
Every malpractice case is a lawsuit by an ill patient against the healer who
tried to make her well.
Black's theory is also supported by a recent study of tax audits which
found that auditors accept the oral testimony of high-status taxpayers more

152. BLACK, BEHAVIOR, supra note 151, at 11. For example, intrafamily abuse is less likely to
be prosecuted than violence against strangers. Their degree of interdependence also matters. Id. at
13, 73.
153. Compare David F Greenberg, Donald Black's Sociology Of Law: A Critique, 17 LAW &
Soc'Y REV. 337, 347, 357-59 (1983) (conceding that individual attributes and relationship "unquestionably influence outcomes" but arguing that subsequent studies refute Black's specific
predictions), with Allan V. Horwitz, Resistance To Innovation In The Sociology of Law: A Response
To Greenberg, 17 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 369, 379-81 (1983) (questioning Greenberg's critique). For
example, scholars debate whether studies showing that blacks and whites receive similar sentences
have any bearing on this claim that crimes committed by blacks against whites will be treated differently than crimes committed by whites against blacks. See id. at 380.
154. BLACK, SOCIOLOGICAL JUSTICE, supra note 151, at 13 & n.75 ("[L]awyers homogenize
and equalize the treatment of cases...."). However, lawyers vary in social status. Id. For an introduction to the evolving status of plaintiffs' lawyers see JEROME E. CARLIN, LAWYERS' ETHICS: A
Uses
SURVEY OF THE NEW YORK CITY BAR (1966); Herbert M. Kritzer, Rhetoric and Reality ...
and Abuses ... Contingencies and Certainties: The American Contingent Fee in Operation 48-49
(Disputes Processing Research Program, Working Paper 12-2, 1996), available at
http://www.polisci.wisc.edu/-kritzer/research/contfee/rhetoric.pdf; and Galanter, supra note 51, at
116 (summarizing the research).
155.

See, e.g., ELIOT FREIDSON, PROFESSION OF MEDICINE: A STUDY OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF

368-69 (Univ. of Chicago Press 1988) (1970) (describing medicine as a
"dominant profession" by virtue of the autonomy it has demanded and been given).
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often than that of low-status taxpayers. The authors concluded "that taxpayers of a low occupational prestige face a higher burden of proof than
either middle- or high-prestige taxpayers."' 5 7 Auditors use clues about social
status to158make inferences about the competence and credibility of the taxpayers.
Experiments have also shown "that the credibility of people in court increases if they testify in a style characteristic of high-status people."'59 Highstatus people seem more competent and trustworthy.' 60 According to one
review, "witnesses such as professionals and executives generally have more
credibility than manual laborers or clerks, whites more than blacks, men
more than women, and so on."' 6' Information about social status is communicated not only by occupation, speech patterns, race, and
6 gender, but also
by other signals such as hairstyle, jewelry, and grooming. 1
These clues make it unwise to rule out the possibility that the occupation, education, income, and social standing of physicians matter in the
courtroom, even though we cannot currently estimate the size and practical
significance of this advantage. At the very least, our respect for, and reliance
upon, physicians may make us more receptive to the media campaigns
waged on their behalf.
G. Unequal LitigationResources

Some of the success that defendants have in cases with strong evidence
of negligence is likely to be the product of superior resources. Money can
be used to buy the services of more talented and more experienced attorneys. It can be used to hire more and better expert witnesses. 64 Inthese
ways and others, superior resources can yield verdicts that were not warranted by the evidence.

156. Kinsey & Stalans, supra note 149, at 153 (reporting that auditors accepted oral testimony
from twenty-two percent of low-status taxpayers, forty-three percent of middle-prestige taxpayers,
and fifty-nine percent of high-prestige taxpayers).
157. Id. The significance of this finding is weakened, however, by the failure to find an association between oral testimony and favorable audits. Id.
158.

Id. at 154.

159. BLACK, SOCIOLOGICAL JUSTICE, supra note 151, at 18 & n.98 (noting, for example, that
high-status individuals make less use of "um" and "uh" and "sort of"). The evidence also "suggests
that status-based expectancies especially influence decisions or judgments about people under conditions of ambiguity or lack of information." Kinsey & Stalans, supra note 149, at 140. Ambiguity
apparently provides an area of discretion within which sociological "tie breakers" can operate.
160.

BLACK, SOCIOLOGICAL

161.

Id. at 18-19.

162.

Id. at 69.

JUSTICE,

supra note 151, at 18 & n. 100.

163. See RUSSELL KOROBKIN, NEGOTIATION THEORY AND STRATEGY 154-56 (2002) (noting
that resources can be deployed to improve the odds of success at trial).
164. Id. at 156 (noting that it is not always cost-effective to do so).
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The theory that superior resources contribute to the jury-reviewer discrepancy rate is consistent with what we know about the relative resources
of malpractice plaintiffs and defendants. Most importantly, defendants usually have more experienced attorneys. Neil Vidmar found that virtually all
medical defendants were represented by attorneys with significant malpractice experience, while sixty-two percent of the patients were represented by
16
attorneys with relatively little experience.
The extra experience matters. Catherine Harris and her colleagues found
that plaintiffs won fifty percent of their trials when a seasoned plaintiff's
attorney was matched against a less seasoned defense counsel, but only ten
percent when the mismatch favored the defendant.' 66 They also found that
plaintiffs. 61
defendants benefited from mismatches four times as often as
However, the findings should be viewed only as suggestive because 6 8the
portfolio.'
study did not control for the quality of cases in each attorney's
Of course, the plaintiff sometimes has the more experienced lawyer.
Perhaps, these mismatches account for some of the plaintiffs' verdicts in
low-odds cases. ' 69 However, defendants benefit from mismatches far more
often than plaintiffs do.
In addition, physicians probably have access to more and better expert
witnesses. Physicians are widely believed to have less difficulty convincing
well-respected practicing physicians to testify on their behalf. If true, this
advantage would allow defense attorneys to be more selective, choosing the
best witnesses for their side.
Defendants also hire more expert witnesses. Despite the fact that plaintiffs, unlike defendants, must offer expert testimony on the issue of damages
and, thus, offer this testimony far more often than defendants,7 0 defendants
still offer more total experts than plaintiffs do at trial.' Malpractice defendants also benefit from the experience that their liability insurers bring to
the litigation team. Experienced insurance representatives can assist their
attorneys in identifying and exploiting strategic advantages.

165. VIDMAR, supra note 4, at 54-55 (finding that sixty-two percent had handled fewer than
four such cases during a four year study).
166.

Harris et al., supra note 5 1, at 243.

167.

Id.

168. However, a different study found that experienced attorneys had larger, but not more
defensible, cases. See SLOAN ET AL., supra note 20, at 185-86. It also found that defense counsel
spend considerably more money on trial preparations when they are defending against another specialist. Id. at 216.
169. See Catherine T. Harris et al., Placing "Standard of Care" in Context: The Impact of
Witness Potential and Attorney Reputation in Medical Malpractice Litigation 28-29 (Wake Forest
Univ. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No. 02-14, 2002), available at http://papers.ssm.comsol3/papers.cfm?abstractaid=333560 (suggesting that strategic factors
may explain why plaintiffs with "non-meritorious" claims sometimes receive compensation).
supra note 20.

170.

See SLOAN

171.

See Vidmar, Are Juries Competent, supra note 10, at 902.

ET AL.,
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Finally, defendants typically possess better access to information about
the circumstances surrounding the plaintiff's treatment than plaintiffs do.
Some of this advantage probably survives discovery. If so, defendants can
exploit this information asymmetry to win cases they should lose.
Thus, it seems reasonable to accept the working assumption that defendants benefit from superior resources more often than plaintiffs. In addition,
the findings of the Harris study make it reasonable to posit that superior resources affect trial outcomes, though the magnitude of this advantage is
unclear. Thus, it seems likely that some of the indefensible cases that end in
defense verdicts reflect the influence of superior resources.
H. Medical Uncertainty and the Burden of Proof
Scholars have overlooked the possibility that much of the difficulty that
malpractice plaintiffs experience in the trial of their strongest cases may
stem from jury reluctance to hold a physician liable when the evidence is
unclear or conflicting. The individuals who sit in the jury box will hear and
rely on experts hired by the respective parties to advance their view of the
case. If the defendant's expert is credible, jurors may find it difficult to determine whether the defendant has been negligent and, thus, may decline to
hold the defendant legally responsible. This deference in the face of doubt
could explain why juries rule for defendants in many cases that experts feel
the plaintiff should win and in most of the cases thought by the expert reviewer to be toss-ups.
In legal terms, this deference can be understood as strict insistence that
the plaintiff meet her burden of proof. As a result, plaintiffs only win if they
have convinced the jury that the defendant violated the standard of care. If
the jury has genuine doubts after hearing the defendant's experts, then that
burden has not been met.
In addition to the burden of proof, the "two schools of thought" rule may
also help to explain the deference that juries pay to medical defendants. In
most states, the jury will be instructed to rule in favor of the defendant if it
finds that respectable medical opinion is divided and the defendant's care
falls within one of the reputable schools of thought.17 This rule is premised
on the judicial belief that juries are not competent to choose the "better"
school of thought when physicians themselves are unable to do so.'73 If the
jury finds the defendant's experts credible, then it may feel obliged to conclude that the defendant's conduct falls within a reputable school of thought.
By contrast, expert reviewers may feel fewer obligations to refrain from

172. See, e.g., Downer v. Veilleux, 322 A.2d 82, 87 (Me. 1974) ("[A] physician does not incur
liability merely by electing to pursue one of several recognized courses of treatment."); Jones v.
Chidester, 610 A.2d 964, 969 (Pa. 1992) (endorsing the "two schools of thought" doctrine); I BARRY
R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW 382-84 (1995) (describing the doctrine).
173. See Philip G. Peters, Jr., The Quiet Demise of Deference to Custom: Malpractice Law at
the Millennium, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 163, 168 (2000).
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judgment because they are medical experts themselves and are making their
judgments in a very different setting.
Jury respect for the burden of proof and the two schools of thought rule
would explain the observed pattern of jury verdicts. When the jury is in
doubt, the benefit of that doubt goes to the defendant. This caution gives
shelter to physicians
who, in the eyes of their peers, have violated the stan74
dard of care.
If this hypothesis is correct, then juries understand the limits of their expertise, and this awareness favors the defendant. That is precisely the
opposite of the effect that the jury's lack of expertise is commonly thought
to have on jury verdicts. Critics assume that the "battle of the experts" frees
juries to award unjustified recoveries. The data suggest that it is more likely
to shelter negligent physicians. Thus, the common presence of clinical uncertainty and professional disagreement may actually help defendants in the
courtroom, rather than create confusion that the plaintiff's attorney can exploit.
Although this hypothesis has not yet been tested, it is consistent with
both the poor success of plaintiffs in cases rated by experts as indefensible
and also their unexpectedly poor success in cases rated as toss-ups, only
twenty to thirty percent of which are won by plaintiffs. It may help explain
why malpractice plaintiffs fare better in front of judges than before juries.
Judges may be more confident than jurors in their ability to determine when
an expert's foundation is thin and, thus, more willing to conclude that a defendant's experts are unconvincing. If this explanation for the low plaintiff
win rate in cases with strong evidence of negligence is true, then it is not
necessary to develop more detailed ex ante standards of care, as some schol75
ars have recommended, in order to protect physicians from unfair verdicts.1

I. Synthesis
Inter-rater variability is almost certainly the least appreciated and least
escapable source of jury-reviewer disagreement. It probably explains most
of the discrepancy rate of ten to twenty percent in low-odds cases, suggesting that further improvements will be very difficult. Its presence is neither a
cause for alarm nor a basis for celebration. Instead, the presence of a modest
level of inter-observer disagreement simply reflects our limited capacity to
reconstruct the past and agree on its propriety.
Two of the factors that can produce jury-reviewer disagreement actually improve the fairness of trial outcomes. Thus, we should welcome
174. Jury deference in the face of apparent medical disagreement may also help to explain
why plaintiffs fare better in front of judges. Perhaps judges are more confident in their ability to
determine when the defendant has manufactured a superficial medical disagreement.
175. See Michelle M. Mello, Of Swords and Shields: The Role of Clinical PracticeGuidelines
in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 645, 668-77 (2001) (reviewing the literature
and separating the proposals into three categories: the ex ante contract model, the judicial notice
model, and the affirmative defense model).
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those jury-reviewer disagreements that arise when a rating given by the insurance company's experts is biased against the plaintiff. Similarly,
disagreements that stem from the jury's access to more complete information simply mean that the system is working as it should.116 However, the
existing data do not provide a basis for estimating the frequency with which
these corrections occur or the portion of the jury-reviewer disagreements
that they explain.
Other likely causes of jury-reviewer disagreement are decidedly unwelcome. They include jury inability to understand complex evidence, one
party's access to superior litigation resources, barriers to truth posed by
some of the rules of trial and pretrial practice, pro-plaintiff jury bias, and
pro-defendant jury bias. Although none of these factors appears to play a
substantial role in the resolution of low-odds cases, several appear to infect
jury decision-making in cases with strong evidence of negligence.
CONCLUSION

Over the past thirty years, three medical malpractice "crises" have come
and gone. In reaction to these crises, three generations of malpractice reform
legislation have been enacted across the country. Yet, the subject of jury
competence remains a front-page issue. Today, it serves as a prime justification for proposals to make fundamental changes in malpractice litigation,
such as the legislative authorization of binding early offers and the creation
of administrative health courts.
It is time to stop relying on intuitions and anecdotes when debating jury
performance. Three decades of research provide an ample evidentiary basis
for evaluating jury decision-making. The findings revealed by that data are
mixed and, in some ways, paradoxical. On the one hand, negligence matters,
weak cases are decided correctly, and juries appear to take the burden of
proof seriously. On the other hand, juries are so reluctant to hold physicians
liable that they render defense verdicts in half of the cases that medical experts think plaintiffs should win. Given the well-established reluctance of
physicians to label other physicians as negligent, this is a remarkable finding
that deserves further research.
On one criterion, juries perform well. The stronger the plaintiff's evidence of negligence, the greater the likelihood of a plaintiff's verdict.
Plaintiffs win 10% to 20% of the cases that reviewers feel they should lose,
20% to 30% of the cases rated as toss-ups, and roughly 50% of the cases
with strong evidence of negligence.
Of most importance to critics is the finding that meritless cases rarely
win. In fact, doctors win a larger percentage of these cases (80% to 90%)
than would be predicted from the data on inter-rater variability. As a result,
176. This factor is likely to play a more important role when the expert review is performed
soon after receipt of the claim than when the review is performed after the case has been closed by
independent experts who have access to the entire case file, especially if it includes a transcript of
the trial testimony.
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the disagreements observed in the low-odds medical malpractice cases can
be fully explained by normal inter-observer disagreement. In addition, some
of these disagreements can probably be attributed to reviewer bias in favor
of physicians and jury access to more complete and stronger evidence of
medical negligence. It is, therefore, unlikely that a significant fraction of the
plaintiffs' verdicts in these cases constitute genuinely erroneous verdicts
caused by factors such as pro-plaintiff jury bias, superior plaintiff's counsel,
and the jury's inability to understand the evidence. In fact, it is possible that
the unexpectedly high agreement rate indicates a pro-defendant bias.
Of course, many physicians will be alarmed by a 10% to 20% chance
that they will be found liable in a case that lacks merit in the eyes of the liability insurer and the defendant. Yet that agreement rate already reveals
more deference by juries to medical defendants than is usually given by
other physicians. If an 80% to 90% agreement is still not good enough, then
the cure is unlikely to lie in piecemeal reforms of a fault-based tort system
or even in more fundamental changes, such as the creation of specialized
medical courts. A nontrivial discrepancy rate is inevitable unless the issue of
fault is removed entirely from the case, as would happen in a no-fault compensation regime. Even then, causation is likely to be a frequently contested
issue.
By contrast, the high rate of disagreement in cases thought by reviewers
to be indefensible (50%) is too large to be explained entirely by inter-rater
variability. Jury access to better information may explain some of that discrepancy rate, but it probably accounts for a small portion of those
disagreements because defendants ordinarily have better access to information about the plaintiff's treatment than plaintiffs do. The rest is probably
produced by factors that systematically favor defendants. The finding that
defendants win roughly 70% of the cases rated as toss-ups also suggests the
operation of pro-defendant factors.
Although the data are not sufficiently detailed to permit a definitive assessment, several explanations are especially promising. First, juries may be
skeptical of patients who sue their doctors. Second, the preliminary evidence, though scanty, suggests that defendants are much more likely than
plaintiffs to have more experienced attorneys and superior experts. Third,
juries may take the burden of proof very seriously in medical malpractice
cases, giving physicians the "benefit of the doubt" when the experts for both
sides are credible. Of the three influences, only the last produces fair outcomes. Unfortunately, the data on jury-reviewer disagreement do not
provide a basis for estimating the relative importance of each of these three
pro-defendant forces. However, they do establish that the cumulative impact
of these factors provides doctors with a significant advantage in front of the
juries.
Collectively, these forces make it quite difficult for malpractice plaintiffs
to win even their strongest cases. Because this finding is contrary to our
usual assumptions about the allocation of risk in the courtroom, little scholarly thought has been given to reforms that might level the playing field.
One important exception is the intriguing suggestion made by Frank Sloan
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and his colleagues that we make it easier for plaintiffs to locate experienced
plaintiffs' attorneys by creating a certified specialty in malpractice litigation. 171
Health courts are another reform that could potentially produce fairer
outcomes for claimants. Because juries are more deferential to the defendant
physicians than expert reviewers are, it is conceivable that medical courts
will rule in favor of claimants in a larger percentage of the cases that independent reviewers think plaintiffs should win. Other attributes of health
courts could also aid plaintiffs. For example, the use of trained judges might
reduce the advantage associated with defendants' superior resources. Similarly, the elimination of hired-gun experts has potential to help plaintiffs
more than defendants because the data show that defendants and their hired
guns are more successful than plaintiffs and their hired guns at persuading
juries to render verdicts at odds with the opinions of medical experts.' If
health courts actually operate in this fashion, then patients, not physicians,
should be lobbying for them.
Of course, none of these hypotheses has been tested. Furthermore, there
are good reasons to fear that health courts will treat patients unfairly. Current proposals for health courts suggest that discovery will be greatly
truncated, fees of plaintiffs' attorneys will be capped, pain and suffering will
be capped, and expert testimony will be restricted to "neutral" experts who
risk regulatory punishment if their testimony is not "objective."'79 Moreover,
the public setting in which these experts will render their opinions could
place considerable pressure on them to demonstrate their loyalty to the profession. As a consequence, these "neutral" experts may show the same
reluctance to label another physician's care as negligent that physicians have
exhibited in other settings. As noted above, researchers have found that physicians are so unwilling to label another physician's care as negligent that
they refuse to do so even when the treatment given to the patient was
"clearly erroneous."'80
There is an obvious tension between the finding that physicians are loath
to indict one another and the evidence that physician reviewers who work
for insurers and researchers are more willing to condemn the tort defendants
than juries are. Setting seems to matter. The relevance of role and context is
most clearly demonstrated by the principal study measuring physician willingness to criticize peers. In this study, the subjects were asked, among other
things, whether the injured patient deserved compensation. Yet the same
scenarios had been deemed "clearly erroneous" by consultants to the re177.

SLOAN ET AL.,

supra note 20, at 215-17.

178. However, health courts would lack the democratic legitimacy associated with jury verdicts. See Peters, supra note 109, at 958-59.
179. Innovative Solutions to Medical Liability: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health of
the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 109th Cong. 6 (2006) (statement of Paul Barringer, General Counsel of Common Good).
180.

See supranote 110.
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search team. In that study, the role played by the physicians mattered. Context may also explain why physicians who perform case reviews for
malpractice insurers and social science researchers are relatively willing to
make negative judgments about other physicians. If they were asked to do
that in the more public setting of health courts, they might be much less
willing to criticize their peers. As a result, our initial experiments with
health courts should be small pilot projects during which researchers collect
the data needed to evaluate the fairness of their outcomes.
In recap, the data demonstrate that juries treat physicians very fairly,
perhaps with too much deference. Given the limits of human capacity to
reconstruct past events and the inevitable subjectivity of judgments about
the quality of past performance, it is probably not possible to design a faultbased adjudication system that will have a substantially higher agreement
rate in the cases with weak evidence of negligence. At most, modest improvements may be possible through careful refinements of trial procedure
and the supervision of expert witnesses. As a consequence, both piecemeal
reforms and more fundamental alternatives to malpractice litigation should
not be driven by the mistaken assumption that juries treat physicians unfairly. Although the current system of resolving malpractice claims has
many shortcomings, neither randomness nor favoritism toward injured patients is among them.
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